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A B S T R A C T
In this opinion paper, we describe a combined view of functional and eﬀective brain connectivity along with the
free-energy principle for investigating persistent disruptions in brain networks of patients with focal epilepsy.
These changes are likely reﬂected in eﬀective connectivity along the cortical hierarchy and construct the basis of
increased local functional connectivity in focal epilepsy. We propose a testable framework based on dynamic
causal modelling and functional connectivity analysis with the capacity of explaining commonly observed
connectivity changes during interictal periods. We then hypothesise their possible relation with disrupted free-
energy minimisation in the Bayesian brain. This may oﬀer a new approach for neuroimaging to speciﬁcally
develop and address hypotheses regarding the network pathomechanisms underlying epileptic phenotypes.
1. Background
Focal epilepsy is a dynamic disorder of the brain that is character-
ized by both paroxysmal abnormal states (e.g. epileptic seizures), and
persistent abnormalities across the functional brain networks (Powell
et al., 2007). Advances in understanding the relationship between these
observable phenomena and underlying pathophysiology have improved
current treatment approaches, such as epilepsy surgery, and can po-
tentially improve patient outcomes (Goodfellow et al., 2016). However,
the neuronal mechanisms underlying the complex symptomatology
observed in patients are still not fully understood. Here we describe a
novel conceptual and analysis framework that allows for the integration
of observations at various scales into a fully speciﬁed dynamic network
model of brain function that can be used to test speciﬁc hypotheses
regarding the network pathophysiological mechanisms underlying
common symptoms in focal epilepsy. This framework rests on the free-
energy principle in the brain's structure-function relationships and will
be illustrated using focal epilepsy as a possible use-case.
Neuronal architectures in the brain are inherently hierarchical and
modular. Dynamic processes within this ‘global integrating system of
local integrators’ can be investigated from two distinct, but closely re-
lated perspectives; namely, functional and eﬀective connectivity.
Functional connectivity analysis provides no directionality between
brain regions and is usually assessed at the macroscopic scale, i.e.,
within or between brain areas. On the other hand, eﬀective connectivity
considers directed inter-cortical (intrinsic) and intra-cortical (extrinsic)
coupling at the mesoscopic (neuronal assemblies) and macroscopic
scales. Several attempts have been made to understand functional in-
tegration mediated by eﬀective connectivity under an overarching
framework. Among them, the formulation of the brain as a predictive
organ that minimises the free-energy of its internal states has attracted
attention (Friston, 2010). Per the free-energy principle, the brain acts as
a Bayesian inference machine that adaptively changes its internal states
or actively re-samples the sensorium to minimize prediction-errors. In
other words, the brain attempts to minimise surprise or the diﬀerence
between prior expectations/beliefs and sensory evidence.
A widely accepted mathematical model of free-energy minimisation
in the brain is known as predictive coding (Friston, 2010; Rao and
Ballard, 1999). In this approach, cortical pyramidal cells are divided
into prediction and prediction-error neurons that form a hierarchy of
cortical regions. This hierarchy integrates prior knowledge with in-
coming sensory evidence to update beliefs about the causes of sensory
inputs. This type of inference can be formulated in terms of Bayesian
statistics, reducing the problem to a simple set of neurobiologically
plausible computations (Bastos et al., 2012). These computations pro-
duce expectations about the causes of a sensory input that can be
equated with conscious or unconscious percepts and ensuing action.
Because predictive coding can be cast as a simple set of mathematical
operations, it provides a computational framework for understanding
how abnormal neuronal message passing leads to aberrant behaviors
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and psychopathology.
Focal epilepsy is deﬁned as consistent seizure onset from a parti-
cular cortical or sub-cortical source with consequent network-wide
changes. Common regions involved in functional network changes in
focal epilepsy include “default mode” cortical areas, piriform cortex,
insula, cingulate cortex, cerebellum, and thalamus (Fahoum et al.,
2012, 2013; Flanagan et al., 2014; Laufs et al., 2011, 2007; Pedersen
et al., 2016). The complex neurobiological underpinnings of these
persistent features are not yet clearly understood. Eﬀective tools to link
empirical observations at the network scale to the underlying patho-
physiology are currently missing.
In this opinion paper, we consider a framework for studying inter-
ictal disruptions of brain networks in patients with focal epilepsy, based
on predictive coding and the concept of a hierarchically organized
Bayesian brain. We will suggest that speciﬁc, identiﬁable changes in
eﬀective connectivity along the cortical hierarchy can be the basis of
increased connectivity in focal epilepsy. First, we outline the free-en-
ergy principle and Bayesian inference and their relationship to brain
dynamics. Second, we explain the link between free-energy and func-
tional/eﬀective connectivity. Third, we describe connectivity changes
during interictal periods in focal epilepsy and hypothesise their possible
relation with disrupted free-energy minimisation in the brain. Finally,
we propose an analytical test for our hypothesis and possible treatment
avenues, in intractable focal epilepsy.
2. The free-energy principle and brain dynamics
2.1. Bayesian inference
We start with explanation of a few basic concepts about Bayesian
inference, necessary for clarifying the rest of our discussion. A condi-
tional probability P(ϑ|y) quantiﬁes the probability of an event ϑ given
the occurrence of another event y:
=P y P y
P y
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where P(y) is the evidence or marginal probability of y and P(ϑ,y) is the
probability of ϑ and y occurring together. The general form of Bayes'
rule is then given by:
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In this formulation, P(ϑ|y) is the posterior density (distribution of
our belief ϑ given observations y), P(y|ϑ) is the likelihood of observa-
tions given the belief and P(ϑ) is the prior density of the belief. Based on
Eqs. (1) and (2), one can rewrite P(y) as:
= +P y P y P P y P( ) ( | ϑ) (ϑ) ( |~ϑ) (~ϑ) (3)
where ~ϑ is the complement of the event ϑ. This leads to a more ex-
plicit form of Bayes' theorem for estimating the posterior density with
respect to an uncertain event:
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Intuitively, Bayes' rule tells us how to ‘learn’ from sampled data
using our beliefs about the causes of observations, shaped by some
priors. This perspective contrasts with frequentist inference, where con-
clusions are drawn based on the frequencies of events happening, with
no prior beliefs about the causes of observations. The Bayesian for-
mulation provides the background for characterizing the brain as a
Helmholtz machine “whose function is to infer the probable causes of the
sensory input” (Dayan et al., 1995). The learning process is then asso-
ciated with Bayesian belief-updating in which prior beliefs are con-
verted into posterior beliefs (the distribution of our beliefs given our
observations) through simulating observations or sensory information.
This ‘belief-updating’ can be performed in many ways. At present,
predictive coding is a very popular process theory for Bayesian belief-
updating in the brain. Eﬀectively, this process can be expressed as a
recursive updating of the expected causes of sensation through a
minimization of precision-weighted prediction errors (Hohwy, 2013;
Mathys et al., 2011):
= + ×New prediction Old prediction precision prediction error. (5)
In the next section, we explain the free-energy principle and its
relationship to the Bayesian brain.
2.2. The Bayesian brain
The free-energy principle is a global theoretic framework about how
brain function supports action, perception and learning. This principle
describes biological systems that resist a tendency to disorder by
adapting internal dynamical states through interacting with their en-
vironment. It is because self-organizing biological systems – such as the
brain – tend to minimize the entropy of their states (Friston, 2010). For
neuronal systems, this means minimising the average surprise experi-
enced through environmental interactions: Simply stated, the brain
generates predictions of its sensory inputs based on generative models
of the world. Where sensory evidence contradicts these predictions, a
prediction error signal is generated and the generative models are up-
dated to improve future predictions.
Mathematically this can be cast in a set of equations. Here, brain
dynamics are assumed to be ergodic processes with long-term averages
equal to their ensemble average. The conditional entropy H(y|m) of a
neuronal input y is then characterized as the average surprise; i.e., the
negative log-evidence (− lnp(y|m)) associated with sensory data, given
a generative model m embodied by the brain:
∫= −→∞H y m T p y m dt( | ) lim 1 ln ( | ) .T T0 (6)
Now, let p(ϑ|y,m) be a true posterior probability associated with the
cause ϑ of sampled sensory inputs y under the generative model m. The
cause ϑ could be any external factor such as visual stimuli or an internal
input from a cortical neuron. The brain tries to approximate p(ϑ|y,m)
regarding a recognition density q(ϑ;μ) shaped by prior beliefs.
The diﬀerence between p(ϑ|y,m) and q(ϑ;μ) is commonly quantiﬁed
by the Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL:
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We also know from the Bayes' rule that:
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where p(y,ϑ|m) is the probability of the joint occurrence of the input y
and its cause ϑ, and p(y|m) is the marginal likelihood of observing y
given the model m. Eq. (7) can therefore be split into two components
leading to the general form of free-energy:
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where F(μ,y) is free-energy and H(y|m) denotes the conditional entropy
or average surprise. Note that ‘free-energy’ as used here stems from the
variational Bayesian paradigm (Bishop, 2006) and should not be con-
fused with ‘thermodynamic free-energy’ – although they can be related
formally (Sengupta et al., 2013).
Due to the Gibb's inequality (or alternatively, Jensen's inequality), the
quantity DKL is always non-negative. Therefore, free-energy is always
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greater than surprise. Under some simplifying assumptions, this free-
energy can be equated with the sum of squared prediction-error mul-
tiplied by the precision of that prediction-error. Taken together this
amounts to a normative description of dynamic brain behavior that can
be modelled as a gradient descent on free-energy or prediction error in
a relatively straightforward fashion (see Eq. (5)). Note that surprise is a
function of sensory inputs only, but free-energy depends on both in-
ternal states in the brain through suﬃcient statistics μ (i.e., quantities
which fully parametrise the recognition density q(ϑ;μ) in Eq. (7)) and
sensory data. In many situations (e.g., a Gaussian recognition density) it
is suﬃcient to specify the mean or expectation of the recognition
density, which is usually denoted by μ. Furthermore, free-energy de-
pends on action α via its eﬀects on sensations that are actively sampled
(i.e., y=y(α)).
The foregoing suggests that the optimum bound on surprise is the
free-energy F(μ,y). By minimising free-energy, the Bayesian brain can
implicitly minimise surprise. At the same time, the diﬀerence between
the true posterior beliefs and the expectations are resolved; thereby
minimising prediction error. The resolution of prediction errors thus
corresponds to updating prior beliefs about causes (i.e., perception),
while actively sampling sensations (to match predictions) through in-
teraction with the environment (i.e., action).
The next section takes the concepts of Bayesian inference and free-
energy further by brieﬂy reviewing hierarchical dynamic models and
how they might be implemented in the brain. The resulting hierarchical
scheme provides the theoretical underpinnings for our discussion of
focal epilepsy and functional brain connectivity.
2.3. Hierarchical Bayesian inference cascades in the brain
In the previous section, we assumed the existence of some gen-
erative models that deﬁne the brain's prior beliefs about how sensations
are caused. Here we consider the nature of these models and their
implications for neuroanatomy and neuronal message passing. In brief,
it is generally assumed that the generative model has a hierarchical
structure. A multi-layer Bayesian inference network is necessary to
model hierarchical nonlinear mappings between causes and observa-
tions encountered in the natural world. Furthermore, the implicit
(hierarchical) simpliﬁcation of causal structure calls on a much smaller
number of computational units (Chalasani, 2013). In hierarchical
models, manifold causes are decomposed into a web or chain of
‘hidden’ causes that become progressively more abstract towards the
higher levels. In other words, the higher levels of the hierarchy (e.g.,
association cortex) deal with multi-dimensional sensory input, while
lower levels (e.g., primary visual cortex) encode less abstract causes
(e.g., lines and shapes of objects causing visual sensory samples).
Suppose an agent observes a dynamic sensory input y given an ex-
ternal cause ϑ with the prior p(ϑ). A generative model provides a
probabilistic description of how that input is caused: p(y,ϑ)=p(y|ϑ)p
(ϑ). In this case, hierarchical dynamic models oﬀer a state-space de-
scription that decomposes p(y,ϑ) into a hierarchy of causal states vi and
hidden dynamical states xi (i=1,… ,N, N being the number of levels in
the model) (Friston, 2010), where ϑ=(xi,vi,θi). These models are ex-
pressed in Eqs. (10a), (10b), (10c) and (11). Note that although all
variables are time dependent (e.g. xi(t)), this explicit dependence is not
shown for simplicity of expression.
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where zi and wi are independent Gaussian observation noise and state
noise processes, respectively:
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The continuous nonlinear functions gi and fi are parametrized by θi
at the ith level and model the predicted responses and hidden states,
respectively. The precision parameters λi model the (inverse) amplitude
of random ﬂuctuations and hence, determine the precision Π(λi) or
reliability of predictions at each level. In this setting, changing hidden
states and causes to minimise free-energy corresponds to hierarchical
perceptual inference, while changing the parameters to minimise free-
energy over time corresponds to learning.
Hierarchical models provide a Markov chain of levels, where all
necessary information for driving the ith layer is provided by the layer
below. An important aspect of hierarchical dynamic models is that
higher-level causes can also inﬂuence lower-level predictions, as the
state-space of hierarchical dynamic models is formed by the hidden
states of the interconnected levels.
Note that the generative model associated with Eqs. (10a), (10b)
and (10c) would be very complicated and constitutes a complete de-
scription of functional brain architectures. Conceptually, we are inter-
ested in the key role that precision plays in mediating the coupling be-
tween hierarchical levels of such models. Practically, the implicit
dynamics in Eqs. (10a), (10b) and (10c) inspire simpliﬁed forms for
modelling observed neuronal activity; for example, the bilinear ap-
proximations used in dynamic causal models (DCMs). Having said this,
the biophysical modelling of neuronal dynamics with DCM does not try
to estimate the generative models that may be used in the brain; al-
though recent advances using canonical microcircuits – as the basis of
neuronal modelling (Bastos et al., 2015) – represent an attempt to move
in this direction.
2.4. Free-energy and brain connectivity
The minimisation of free-energy can be eﬀectively modelled in
computational neuroscience using the predictive coding framework
(Friston, 2010). In predictive coding, ‘top-down’, ‘backward’ or ‘des-
cending’ connections convey predictions from higher processing levels
to lower ones, whereas ‘bottom-up’, ‘forward’ or ‘ascending’ connec-
tions convey prediction-errors in the opposite direction (Fig. 1). From a
neurobiological point of view, superﬁcial (supragranular) and deep
(infragranular) pyramidal cells in the cortex are considered as sources
of forward (prediction-error) and backward (prediction) signalling,
respectively (for review see Bastos et al. (2012)). See also Kanai et al.
(2015) for a discussion of how optimal precision weighting could be
mediated in the brain; in the setting of visual attention and feature
selection.
The units depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 are not limited to locally con-
nected neural circuits, but at diﬀerent spatial scales, from neurons and
macrocolumns through to macroscopic brain regions Park and Friston
(2013). See also Towlson et al. (2013) for a good discussion on whether
brain networks are scale invariant – i.e., we expect topological simi-
larity between microscale and macroscale brain networks.
Long-range connections are of excitatory nature and therefore,
mediated by the neurotransmitter glutamate (mainly, through two
types of the sector: AMPA and NMDA) that are in turn modulated by
short-range GABAergic neurons (Bastos et al., 2012; Litvak et al., 2015;
Penny, 2012). Therefore, the red-colour arrows in Figs. 1 and 2 will
play an important role in modelling long-range connections. In our
neuronal model, we consider no set (anatomical) distance between
neuronal ‘units’ – thus, unit i and unit i + 1 in Fig. 1 may be ‘long-range
neighbours’ (e.g., two remote cortical areas).
Crucially, the ascending prediction-errors are determined by the
diﬀerence between prediction and sensory input, weighted by a
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precision term (controlled by postsynaptic gain; e.g. mediated by
postsynaptic dopamine receptor D1) (Edwards et al., 2012). Fig. 2 il-
lustrates the prediction-error update process at each hierarchical layer.
In this neurobiological formulation of predictive coding, there is an
intimate relationship between neuronal computation and local, as well
as global connectivity. Hierarchical implementation of recurrent mes-
sage passing (Fig. 1) equips brain dynamics with multiple causal in-
teractions; including both intrinsic connections (coupling between
cortical subpopulations) and extrinsic connections (passing messages
between areas along the cortical hierarchy). The integration of these
intrinsic and extrinsic neuronal architectures provides a basis for the
development of stable functional networks with certain local (within-
region) and global (between-region) network properties. The ensuing
computational framework may help understand how localised aberrant
connectivity (e.g. localised hypersynchrony in an epileptogenic area of
the cortex) is linked to connectivity changes between brain areas (e.g.
increased functional segregation seen in focal epilepsy).
3. Abnormal brain networks in focal epilepsy: disrupted free-
energy minimisation?
Epilepsy describes a wide array of primary neurological conditions
that share a predisposition to recurrent epileptic seizures. These sei-
zures are disruptions in normal neurological function caused by ab-
normal, often hypersynchronous activity in the brain. Where this ac-
tivity apparently arises from a speciﬁc area of the brain, the epilepsy
can be described as focal. Even within the group of focal epilepsies, the
causes are varied: In a set of childhood ‘benign seizure susceptibility
syndromes’ (Panayiotopoulos et al., 2008), focal seizure arises from a
recognizable set of brain areas without associated focal lesions (e.g. in
benign epilepsy with centrotemporal spikes, BECTS). On the other
hand, in most adult patients with focal epilepsies the pathophysiology is
directly related to localised brain lesions. Seizures in the latter group
are often drug treatment resistant and associated with a high degree of
morbidity, including cognitive impairments (Rayner et al., 2016).
Despite the focal onset of individual seizures, focal epilepsies are
thought to involve widespread functional brain network abnormalities
beyond the apparently epileptogenic zone and even during interictal,
‘resting state’ activity (Berg et al., 2010). Reported changes at the
macroscopic network level include increased segregation within dis-
tributed functional networks (van Diessen et al., 2014). In fact, there is
increasing evidence from neuroimaging studies for the engagement of a
shared set of brain areas that are recruited during interictal states –
despite the heterogeneous nature of focal epilepsy (Laufs et al., 2011).
These altered patterns of functional connectivity may be caused by
synaptic changes induced by seizure activity and thus reﬂect the se-
verity and duration of disease. This speaks to their potential use as
biomarker for progressive network dysfunction in focal epilepsies (Yaﬀe
et al., 2015) – leading to a more mechanistic understanding of the
impact of epilepsy on wider brain function (Smith and Schevon, 2016).
Widespread functional connectivity alterations are observed inter-
ictally in focal epilepsies arising from identiﬁed neocortical lesions (e.g.
focal cortical dysplasias, Englot et al. (2015)), from archicortical lesions
(e.g. hippocampal sclerosis, Coito et al. (2016)), and idiopathic focal
epilepsies without identiﬁable lesions (e.g. benign epilepsy with cen-
trotemporal spikes, Adebimpe et al. (2015)). The overlap between
networks aﬀected across these diﬀerent focal epilepsies suggest that
functional connectivity changes are not only the result of anatomical
connections of the epileptic focus to its speciﬁc cortical targets, but
rather represents a shift in functional dynamics of the cortical network
Fig. 1. A simpliﬁed schematic of the hierarchical predictive
coding in the cortex. This schematic is based on Fig. 1 in
Edwards et al. (2012), published under the terms of Crea-
tive Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0). Each
yellow box represents a cortical column as a predictive
coding unit. In this scheme, pyramidal cells are divided into
two classes of prediction (black triangles) and prediction-
error (red triangles). Predictive coding is then implemented
according to a hierarchical scheme: ‘top-down’, ‘backward’
or ‘descending’ neuronal connections (black arrows)
transfer predictions from higher processing levels to lower
ones, whereas ‘bottom-up’, ‘forward’ or ‘ascending’ neu-
ronal connections (red arrows) convey prediction-errors in
the opposite direction. The term ‘prediction-error’ here re-
fers to the (precision-weighted) diﬀerence between ex-
pectations and predictions at each unit. The precision-
weights (green arrows) are controlled by postsynaptic
neuromodulation (e.g. conferred by D1-dopamine re-
ceptors). The internal feedback loop within each unit con-
stitutes ‘intrinsic’ connectivity, whereas between-unit interactions lead to ‘extrinsic’ connectivity. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 2. (a) A typical hierarchical processing unit presented
in Fig. 1 with an input from its previous layer (incoming
red arrow on the left) and an output to its next layer
(outgoing red arrow on the right). The precision-weighting
signal is illustrated by a green arrow. According to this
model, the intrinsic connectivity of local microcircuits and
extrinsic connectivity between cortical regions become in-
tegrated: Abnormal precision signalling can lead to aber-
rant intrinsic connectivity and increased local functional
connectivity, with decreased extrinsic connectivity, as ob-
served for example in focal epilepsy. (b) A normal free-
energy minimisation cycle associated with the hierarchical
processing unit presented in (a). The input and output
signals (red arrows) of panel (a) are also illustrated in this
cycle. The blue circles show where precision (i.e., neuronal
excitability or postsynaptic gain) may be subverted by focal
epilepsy. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
A. Omidvarnia et al. NeuroImage: Clinical 15 (2017) 682–688
685
as a whole. This implies that cortico-cortical connectivity is altered and
may not directly involve the epileptogenic focus. This speaks to our
previous work, where we postulate that the epileptogenic focus may
isolate itself from wider brain networks, also in the interictal state
(Pedersen et al., 2015). The putative synaptic changes underlying cor-
tico-cortical network abnormalities seen across the focal epilepsies are
the focus of our current treatment.
We argue that macroscopic changes of brain functional connectivity
observed in a range of focal epilepsy syndromes may stem from a dis-
rupted cycle of free-energy minimization at the level of individual
cortical columns and levels of cortical hierarchies. Thus, we are not
trying to explain the generation of seizures, but the associated (and
likely secondary) eﬀects on whole brain dynamics apparent in interictal
measurements of ongoing brain activity described above. While some of
these eﬀects may be mediated through cortico-subcortical loops, we
suggest that they can be modelled as coupling changes between popu-
lations within the cortex. The ensuing model absorbs both direct sy-
naptic connections between cortical areas, and statistical dependencies
mediated through shared cortico-subcortical loops into aberrant (cor-
tico-cortical) eﬀective connectivity. As outlined above, the minimiza-
tion cycle involves passing predictions and prediction errors between
levels of the cortical hierarchy, in a way that depends upon the relative
precision or postsynaptic gain that predominates at each level. Here,
precision encodes the expected conﬁdence or reliability of prediction-
errors and can be regarded as a measure of signal-to-noise. Crucially,
precision itself has to be estimated and optimized during perceptual
(and active) inference. In other words, each hierarchical processing unit
has to predict both the expected pattern of the neuronal input it samples
and the reliability or precision of the evidence that is elicited. At a
physiological level, precision is thought to be encoded by the synaptic
gain or excitability of superﬁcial pyramidal populations encoding pre-
diction-error, which depends on neuromodulation, via e.g. the dopa-
minergic system. Precise prediction-errors are thus aﬀorded a greater
inﬂuence over higher-level representations generating top-down pre-
dictions.
Any pathophysiology that disrupts the modulation or control of
cortical excitability will have profound implications for perceptual in-
ference (Boly et al., 2011). Physiologically, aberrant prediction-error
update in the Bayesian brain would manifest as a blockade on recurrent
message passing among diﬀerent hierarchical levels and a reduction of
globally coherent hierarchical neuronal coupling. Persistent reoccur-
rence of these abnormal changes may result in a loss of global in-
tegration between widespread brain functional networks. In other
words, predictive coding provides a computational framework within
which to understand how pathophysiological failures of intrinsic con-
nectivity and neuromodulation would lead to false inference and per-
ceptual and motor symptoms.
Several neurobiological changes are purported to underlie localized
seizure susceptibility in seizure onset zones in focal epilepsy (e.g. ex-
citation-inhibition imbalance, abnormal local neuronal circuitry, mod-
ulation of neuronal responses through abnormal glial cell homeostatic
function). Many of these microscopic changes, at the mesoscale may
converge to result in abnormal precision control of pyramidal cell re-
sponses, or abnormal synaptic gain. If otherwise normal prediction-
error signalling at an ensemble of hierarchical Bayesian processing
units is modulated by pathological precision, it essentially clamps the
associated message-passing representations to a particular value. Such
an overly precise representation becomes impervious to inﬂuences from
ascending prediction-errors. In other words, it blocks belief-updating at
higher levels of the hierarchy.
Local abnormalities in the function of a cortical area in focal epi-
lepsy may therefore explain abnormally increased segregation even in
interictal, macroscopic functional networks. From an electro-
physiological perspective, this would be manifest as a reduction in as-
cending and descending aﬀerent extrinsic (between-layer) connectivity,
reﬂecting the fact that processing in the level(s) of the localized
pathology is impervious to ascending prediction-errors or descending
predictions. A macroscopic demonstration of this altered functional
connectivity in focal epilepsy would be the emergence of state-speciﬁc
brain network abnormalities that may be a result of recurrent seizure
suppression over the disease's progression.
Evidence of such eﬀects can be found in several measures, but
would be most clear in analyses that can reveal directed connectivity.
Recently, DCM has emerged as a ﬂexible model-based analysis method
for electrophysiological data that allows inference on the causal re-
lationship between a network of coupled sources, both at the macro-
and mesoscale. Indeed, provisional DCM evidence from patients with
impaired levels of consciousness demonstrates a loss of descending
connectivity from prefrontal to temporal regions during an auditory
mismatch negativity paradigm (Boly et al., 2011). DCM eﬀectively in-
tegrates observation at diﬀerent scales. While there are several DCM
studies of epilepsy, most have focused on single sources and changes in
excitability during seizure at the level of local microcircuits.
One might predict that DCM of electrophysiological measurements,
or even of resting state fMRI time series in focal epilepsy may show
similar failures of extrinsic connectivity across common epileptic brain
nodes. Extending our view of persistent dysfunction in the epileptic
brain to coupling abnormalities between hierarchically organized
sources may (1) aid a mechanistic understanding of varied cognitive
comorbidities seen in epilepsy, and (2) be a potentially important way
to develop an individualized and non-invasive prognostic biomarker for
patients with focal epilepsy by classifying them in accordance to their
persistent brain functional abnormalities.
As an interim summary, we postulate that disturbances in local
connectivity, mediated through an excessively precise prediction-error
signal, compromises eﬀective extrinsic connectivity between hier-
archically coupled cortical sources. This gives rise to increased local
and decreased global functional connectivity, observable at the mac-
roscale in focal epilepsy. This locally abnormal activity may also cause
further synaptic changes leading to the emergence of abnormal cou-
pling between other cortical areas, and thus exert a wider impact on
Bayesian inference circuitry. In fact, ‘commonly observed’ brain areas
in focal epilepsy such as insular, piriform and cingulate cortices may
subserve hubs with abnormal precision control. Many of these features
would cause measurable changes in brain function, many of which
would relate naturally to analysis using dynamic causal modelling as
we will discuss below.
4. A testable framework using dynamic causal modelling
The following testable framework allows for inference on meso-
scopic and macroscopic connectivity changes at both individual and
group levels and could be divided into three successive steps:
A) Functional connectivity analysis: detection of ‘common’ brain networks
in focal epilepsy
Persistent functional connectivity changes in focal epilepsy can be
evaluated using inter-ictal fMRI or EEG-fMRI. Using graph theory-based
measures of functional connectivity, abnormalities shared between
patients are characterized as a set of aﬀected network nodes, which
aﬀords a focus for more detailed analysis of eﬀective connectivity. For
this approach, networks of interest need to be identiﬁed to minimize
model complexity and maximize the prior plausibility of DCM. Nodes
can be identiﬁed in several ways. These can be based on existing robust
networks identiﬁable from resting state data (e.g. the default node
network), networks that are known to be involved in aspects of the
symptomatology of the epilepsy condition at hand (e.g. language re-
lated network in BECTS, Vannest et al. (2017)), or regions implicated in
other neuroimaging studies. Target regions include the fronto-insula
cortex (ipsilateral), superior temporal gyrus (ipsilateral), posterior
cingulate cortex (left and right), the piriform cortex (ipsilateral)
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(Fahoum et al., 2012; Laufs et al., 2011; Pedersen et al., 2016) and the
suspected seizure onset zone.
B) Eﬀective connectivity analysis: Detection of causal relations within
common networks
Eﬀective connectivity can be estimated from a variety of neuronal
signals, including resting state fMRI using cross spectral DCM on a
subset of network nodes (Friston et al., 2014). DCM allows for the ﬁt-
ting of network models to functional signals using diﬀerent, competing
model architectures. Bayesian model comparison, then allows statistical
inference, as to which model has most likely produced the data. For
each individual subject, speciﬁc eﬀective connectivity network archi-
tectures can therefore be compared: architectures with and without
hierarchical forward and backward connections; with and without ab-
normal intrinsic connectivity within seizure onset zones; with and
without changes in extrinsic connectivity of speciﬁc regions of interest,
such as the posterior cingulate cortex, or the fronto-insular cortices.
Shared eﬀective connectivity network architectures can then be iden-
tiﬁed using ﬁxed eﬀects Bayesian model selection. The assumption here
is that all participants share the same underlying functional archi-
tecture.
C) Parametric empirical Bayesian modelling of group eﬀects
Applying recent advances on integrated (empirical Bayesian) mod-
elling of group eﬀects on DCMs (Litvak et al., 2015), one can test sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects of individual subject-speciﬁc parameters (such as age of
epilepsy onset, duration of disease, frequency of seizures, degree of
cognitive problems) on the connectivity estimates. This can be done
both in fMRI data, using the network architecture identiﬁed above and
making inference on macroscale networks, or in EEG data where
available, allowing inference on mesoscale, local dynamics.
The hierarchical (cortical) architectures implied by generative
models in the brain (i.e., Eqs. (10a), (10b) and (10c)) are used for un-
derstanding of aberrant precision control in the genesis of interictal
activity using DCM. However, it should be noted that DCM is not, at
present, capable of inferring the precise architectures implied by gen-
erative models with the general form of Eqs. (10a), (10b) and (10c).
Rather, the form of message passing implied by a hierarchical gen-
erative model places constraints on the eﬀective connectivity one
would expect to mediate normal and interictal dynamics in the brain.
Put simply, Eqs. (10a), (10b) and (10c) prescribe a generic neuronal
message passing that is usually understood in terms of predictive coding
(although equivalent variational message passing schemes exist in the
context of a discrete state space generative models (Friston et al.,
2016a, b)). These schemes involve passing predictions and prediction-
errors between hierarchical levels of cortical brain architectures; where
the inﬂuence of ascending prediction-errors is controlled by precision.
Physiologically, this means we would expect extrinsic (long range)
connections in DCM to convey predictions and prediction-errors, while
intrinsic (within region) DCM connections primarily reﬂect the preci-
sion or gain aﬀorded to prediction-errors. This means a suﬃcient de-
scription of interictal activity could be cast purely in terms of aberrant
precision control, reﬂected in abnormal intrinsic (self) connectivity in
standard (bilinear) DCMs of cortical hierarchies. Clearly, the level of
detail aﬀorded by a DCM makes it diﬃcult to map directly onto the
highly nonlinear and structured connectivity (predictive coding) ar-
chitectures that would be required to invert models with the general
form of Eqs. (10a), (10b) and (10c). For example, most current DCMs
for fMRI do not distinguish between forward and backward connections
and have a very limited parameterisation of intrinsic connections. This
is because DCM lumps together multiple neuronal populations within
any one region, which precludes lamina-speciﬁc connectivity and a
proper distinction between inter and intralaminar connections. Having
said this, a crude approximation of the pathophysiology suggested by
our theoretical treatment suggests a special focus on intrinsic con-
nectivity as the mediator – or signature – of interictal pathophysiology.
Furthermore, there are ongoing eﬀorts to make DCMs suﬃciently de-
tailed, so that they can be related directly to the predictive coding
schemes described above. See Bastos et al. (2012, 2015) for a particular
example in the dynamic causal modelling of electromagnetic activity
and Fogelson et al. (2014) and Ranlund et al. (2016), for applications in
the context of schizophrenia research. Finally, there have been recent
advances in the dynamic causal modelling of fMRI data which may be
especially relevant for the current thesis; namely, the ability to model
haemodynamics using the same canonical microcircuits that underlie
predictive coding: see Friston et al. (2017).
Such an approach would allow for (1) the identiﬁcation of shared
network abnormalities within a patient group with focal epilepsy when
compared to controls, (2) the characterization of the network ab-
normality in terms of an eﬀective connectivity architecture with dis-
sociated forward and backward sources, and (3) the analysis of subject-
speciﬁc eﬀects of disease variables speciﬁcally on the presumptive
causal network structures (i.e. synaptic connection strengths underlying
the functional connectivity).
The DCM framework provides robust tools that allow inference on
network conﬁgurations from neuroimaging data. Using Bayesian model
reduction (BMR), even very large model spaces – encompassing many
possible network conﬁgurations – can be ranked for Bayesian model
comparison in a matter of seconds, given an inverted ‘full’ DCM that
contains all possible connections (which takes a few minutes to invert).
Furthermore, where the true model architecture is not known, Bayesian
model averaging will provide the best available parameter estimates,
accounting for uncertainty over model architectures. Taken together,
these tools therefore allow (1) eﬃcient estimation of both parameters
and model evidence to allow for modelling of individual patient net-
works, and therefore (2) exploration of large model spaces to reduce
biasing the analysis towards a subset of hypotheses. Of particular in-
terest here are recent developments for hierarchical modelling of dis-
tributed networks with DCM. Here, the hierarchy relates to the diﬀer-
ence between within-epoch, between-epoch and between-subject
eﬀects that may be very useful for tracking changes in coupling over
seconds or minutes (i.e., hierarchical modelling of between-epoch ef-
fects) and, crucially, identifying pathophysiology through group dif-
ferences in connectivity (i.e., hierarchical modelling of between-subject
eﬀects). See Friston et al. (2015, 2016a, b) and Litvak et al. (2015) for a
discussion of these technical developments.
5. Predictions and therapeutic interventions
The approach outlined here focuses on identifying pathophysiology
underlying persistent network abnormalities in focal epilepsy. Seizure
frequency, or epileptiform discharges seen on clinical EEG may not
themselves correspond closely with the overall burden on brain func-
tion posed by the epilepsy. This has direct clinical relevance, particu-
larly for the potentially associated cognitive burden. Identifying non-
invasive network measures associated with abnormal inference, and
therefore presumably cognitive problems may become a useful clinical
tool to aid the prognosis and guide the need for further intervention and
therapeutic support.
In terms of therapeutic interventions, hierarchical predictive coding
speaks to several possibilities. If hierarchical processing depends sen-
sitively on the encoding of precision and associated neuromodulatory
gain control, then it may be possible to harness endogenous mechan-
isms to rebalance hierarchical precision or gain. For example, inter-
ventions that induce attention or sensory attenuation, should (in
theory) change precision and postsynaptic gain using endogenous me-
chanisms that, if judiciously induced at the appropriate hierarchical
level, could aﬀord a mechanism for rebalancing. Appropriate cognitive-
behavioral therapy, pharmacological neuromodulation, or even tran-
scranial and deep-brain electrical stimulation may become relevant
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therapies for cognitive improvements in focal epilepsy.
6. Time to consider the free-energy principle for epilepsy?
Understanding the relationship between symptoms and the under-
lying dynamic network properties of the epileptic brain remains a major
challenge in human epilepsy research, particularly when considering
the cognitive impact of the disorder (Badawy et al., 2012). The free-
energy framework, together with dynamic causal modelling approaches
to estimating eﬀective connectivity may oﬀer a new approach for
neuroimaging to speciﬁcally develop and address hypotheses regarding
the network pathomechanisms underlying epileptic phenotypes.
Persistent functional network abnormalities in the brain, commonly
observed across the heterogeneous spectrum of focal epilepsy can be
modelled and explained using eﬀective connectivity within the free-
energy framework. In the context of hierarchical Bayesian inference,
the pathophysiology of focal epilepsy may render them unable to pass
on prediction-errors to higher neuronal levels that update the gen-
erative models. This would cause more broadly an increased segrega-
tion of functional brain nodes in focal epilepsy as a secondary eﬀect of
the local deﬁciency in recurrent neuronal message passing. The de-
scription of focal epilepsy as a disease of excessive surprise (or preci-
sion) in the Bayesian brain ﬁts well with the false inference implications
of this pathophysiology and together with dynamic causal modelling,
may be developed further into a tool to identify and characterize such
abnormalities.
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